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BACK TO POLITICS: LESSONS FROM THE
CRISIS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Ignacio A. Boulin Victoria*
INTRODUCTION
Rights language is often used in international law as a powerful trans-
lation of political claims. In such a way, the actors on the international
political stage play their part packaging their interests as rights. This tactic,
however, brings with it an impoverishment of dialogue: as they ought to
trump in every political controversy, the presence of rights in the discussion
leave almost no room for anything else.'
Under this paradigm, the importance of human rights international
treaty bodies has logically increased; to the extent that human rights are the
legal synonyms of goodness, beauty and truth, then treaty bodies are their
modern oracles. Particularly in Latin America, where international human
rights law and the regional bodies in charge of its application, the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, played a critical role in the transition from military regimes
to democracy.' this idea bears a well-rooted legitimacy.
* Ignacio A. Boulin Victoria, LL.M. 2014, Harvard Law School.
1. On rights as trumps, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978). Crit-
icizing the rights language, see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment
of Political Discourse (1991). For a critical perspective, see David Kennedy, The Dark
Side of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism 4-35 (2004).
2. A direct example that will be addressed later is Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Re-
port on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, OEA/Ser.L.IV/II.49,?doc. 19 corr. I
(1980). For a general description of the process, see Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink,
International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America, 54(3) INT'L ORC. 633
(2000). Against this idea, see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC E. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (2005) (stating "[iun fact, human rights violations declined in
[Honduras and Argentina, who had signed ICCPR and Uruguay and Paraguay who had
not] at roughly the same time, for roughly the same reason: increased international
attention to the human rights practices of the two states, followed by a new U.S. policy
under the Carter administration, supported by Congress, to withdraw aid from govern-
ments that violated human rights. Neither the activists nor journalists who highlighted
the human rights abuses nor the Carter administration distinguished between signatories
and nonsignatories. And the Carter administration's pressure against all four countries
was sufficient to reduce human rights violations where they occurred. Public concern
followed by coercion, not the human rights treaties, is the explanatory factor here.").
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Notwithstanding its reputation, during the last fifteen years several
countries have challenged the Inter-American Human Rights System. In
1998, the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago notified the Organization of
American States (OAS) of its denunciation of the American Convention on
Human Rights.3 In 1999, Peru withdrew its recognition of the contentious
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, recognizing it again in 2001.4
More recently, Venezuela denounced the American Convention on Human
Rights in 2012. 5 In addition to these events, from 2011 to 2013 the Inter-
American system faced a crisis-a revision procedure was set up to reform
the system in order to, euphemistically, strengthen it6-and although the
crisis has nominally been resolved, the challenge to the system's effective-
ness remains.
These recurring problems are enough to show that the interaction
among the different stakeholders-namely states, human rights non-govern-
mental organizations, the Commission, the Court and the Organization of
American States which functions as the institutional shelter of the Inter-
American system-is far from being pacific. As they have no influence
over either the sword or the purse7 in regional politics, the Commission and
the Court are at the center of intense disputes with no leverage other than
their own ability to build up their legitimacy.
This persistent crisis of the Inter-American system raises a perplexing
question for scholars and practitioners: is there any way to prevent these
disruptions? Maybe the system was designed precisely to generate conflict,
to allow an external party to examine states' human rights abuses, and the
best we can do is to learn how to live with the situation. It might well be
that these types of clashes are the ones that every human rights institution
should be in the midst of, if it embodies its role in a consistent manner.
3. Organization of American States [OAS], American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American
Convention]. Trinidad and Tobago notified the OAS on May 26, 1998. OAS, B-32:
American Convention on Human Rights: Declarations/Reservations/Denunciationsl
Withdrawals, Inter-Am. Comm'n Hum. Rts., http://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/
Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm#2 1.
4. See id. The withdrawal was on July 8, 1999. It re-recognized the jurisdiction on
January 29, 2001.
5. See American Convention, supra note 5; OAS, Minister of Popular Power for
Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Sept. 6, 2012.
6. About the strengthening process and a brief description and links to the main
documents, see OAS, Process for Strengthening the IACHR: Methodology, http://
www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/strengthening.asp.
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, 425 (Alexander Hamilton).
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While this answer is possible, I will argue in this Article that the Inter-
American system might be trapped in the boundaries of its own mental
scheme. Operators of the system are part of the larger human rights move-
ment, and perhaps, as David Kennedy has argued,8 they are oversimplifying
complex conflicts in uncomplicated stories of villain states, innocent vic-
tims and heroic human rights defenders. From a related but different per-
spective, it may be that the straightforward process of violation of absolute
rights and suitable reparations is incapable of recognizing the multiple nu-
ances of long standing problems.9
To escape this trap of inevitable inefficacy, I will suggest there is a
dire need for innovative thinking. It would be wise to enhance the Commis-
sion's political attributions rather than persisting in strengthening its adjudi-
cative functions. The first section of this Article will briefly analyze the
Inter-American system and its two main bodies, the Commission and the
Court. After that, I will describe the causes of its current crisis, and the roles
that Venezuela, Brazil and the Unites States played. In the next part, I will
point out some conceptual tools upon which my proposal of intensifying the
political face of the Commission is built: I believe we are facing a favorable
occasion to rethink the analytical foundations of human rights activism and
strategy. The world has changed in almost every possible way from the one
the human rights movement faced after World War II, when the idea of
international protection of human rights took off. In this sense, new modifi-
cations might require different tools for action. In the following chapter, I
will try to retrieve the original intent for the Inter-American Commission-
which I suggest was closer to a political body than a quasi-judicial body-
and I will describe one successful case of its performance of political func-
tions. Next, I will suggest that the lessons from the past support the idea
that the Commission should give its political functions at least as much
importance as its adjudicative functions. Finally, I will present a theoretical
problem to be solved in further investigations-why do some measures
generate compliance, whereas other generate crisis?
A disclaimer: I will not propose what everybody knows would be posi-
tives for the system, such as a larger budget or permanent commissioners.
My aim in this Article is to suggest elements that might strengthen the
Commission without significant institutional reform of the system. Al-
though such a reform would be desirable, it currently seems a utopian goal.
8. See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 4-35.
9. Stephan Sonnenberg & James L. Cavallaro, Name, Shame, and Then Build
Consensus? Bringing Conflict Resolution Skills to Human Rights, 39 WASH. U.J.L. &
POL'Y, 257, 300 (2012).
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I. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND THE CURRENT CRISIS
A. Brief Description of the Inter-American System of Human Rights
The conjunction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is usually referred to as the
Inter-American System of Human Rights. It is institutionally sheltered by
the OAS, the multilateral organism that includes every American state but
Cuba. 10
The OAS was founded in 1948 as an international institution based on
the classic principles of international law-non-intervention and states'
sovereign equality."I It was one of a number of post-1945 projects to estab-
lish multilateral organisms to secure peace through cooperation. 12 In this
trend, the human rights idea played a major role 3 and it was little surprise
that fundamental rights-as they were called-were mentioned in the Bo-
goti Charter of 1948, the founding instrument of the OAS.14
10. The OAS was founded in 1948, after the adoption of the Charter of the OAS,
in BogotA, Colombia. See generally, Hugo Martfnez de Zela, The Organization of
American States and its Quest for Democracy in the Americas, 8 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 23
(2013). Cuba was suspended from the OAS in 1962. OAS, Final Act of the Eighth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at 12, OEA/Ser.C/1 1.8 (Jan.
22-31,1962). The suspension was lifted in 2009, through Resolution 2438. OAS, Reso-
lution on Cuba, AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-0/09) (June 9, 2009). Nevertheless, Cuba re-
jected to rejoin the OAS. See, Cuba rejects OAS membership, officials say, CNN.coM,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/06/04/cuba.oas/ (June 4, 2009, 2:16
p.m.).
11. Charter of the Organization of American States [OAS Charter], preamble,
arts.], 5, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 199 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 13 Dec.
1951) available at the Avalon Project web-site http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20thcentury/
decad062.asp.
12. John G. Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 INT'L
ORG. 561, 584 (1992). According to Ruggie, states organize their relations among them
based not only in their own self-interest but also in some shared principles that order
their interactions. The principles that sustain this type of arrangement engenders what
Ruggie, following Keohane, calls a "diffuse sense of reciprocity." This means states
create multilateral arrangements because they believe that in the long run the system
will beneficiate them, even though they might not obtain a particular advantage in every
single interaction. Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT'L
ORG. 1 (1986) (discussing the idea of diffuse reciprocity).
13. Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New (2001).
14. OAS Charter, supra note 12, art. 5 (j): "The American States proclaim the
fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or
sex."
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In parallel, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man,' 5 adopted in 1948 alongside the OAS Charter, crystalized the commit-
ment of American States to the emerging idea of human rights in a written
promise. This document, nonetheless, did not create any machinery to en-
force its provisions. Moreover, its legal condition-an international declara-
tion-gave no reason for states to consider it as a legally binding
document.' 6
However, twelve years later, in 1960, the OAS Council established the
Inter-American Human Rights Commission (the Commission).' 7 Although
the Commission was created to promote the rights contained in the Ameri-
can Declaration, its initial mandate was limited to preparing country stud-
ies.' 8 The American Convention on Human Rights,' 9 adopted in 1978,
represented a significant advance for the regional protection of victims. It
not only established a complete catalogue of human rights but also empow-
ered the Commission as a treaty-based body and created a court to adjudi-
cate cases against those states willing to accept its jurisdiction.20 The
institutional machinery of the Inter-American system essentially followed
the European regional pattern. 2'
I. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The Commission consists of seven members who represent Member
States of the OAS. 22 They are elected by the General Assembly of the OAS,
15. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man [American Declara-
tion], O.A.S. Res. XXX, May 2, 1948.
16. Robert K. Goldman, History and Action: The Inter-American Human Rights
System and the Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 31 HuM.
RTS. Q. 856 (2009).
17. Hector Faundez Ledesma, El Sistema Interamericano de Protecci6n de los
Derechos Humanos: Aspectos Institucionales y Procesales [The Interamerican Human
Rights Protection System: Institutional and Procedure Aspects] 34 (3d ed. 1999).
18. Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100
AM. J. INT'L. L. 783, 794 (2006).
19. American Convention, supra note 4.
20. Id. ch. VII & VIII.
21. Goldman, supra note 17, at 866.
22. American Convention, supra note 4, arts. 34-35. This provision has no parallel
in chapter VIII of the American Convention, when referring to the Inter-American
Court. In a way, and since the beginning-a similar clause appears in the Rules of
Procedure of 1966, article 1-the Commission seems to be shaped not as an indepen-
dent judge but as an interested party.
2015-2016]
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from a list of candidates proposed by the governments of the states. 23 The
Commissioners' term lasts four years, with a possibility of one re-election.2 4
The permanent staff of the Commission is lead by an Executive Secre-
tary, who is appointed by the Secretary General of the OAS.25 Although the
Executive Secretary is, in principle, an administrative leader, its power is
reinforced by the fact that the Commissioners' jobs are part-time: they are
not required to reside in Washington, D.C. but just to travel the sessions.
They do not receive salary for their dedication. 26 Thus, from a functional
point of view, the Executive Secretary can lead the institution in shaping its
agenda.27
The functions of the Commission have developed during its history. In
its origins the Commission was thought of more as a study group than as
the quasi-judicial body it is today. 28 But its broad mandate-to "promote
respect for and defense of human rights" in the Americas 29-has allowed
the Commission to significantly increase its scope of action.
23. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 36.
24. Id. art. 37.
25. OAS, Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Oct. 1,
1979, O.A.S. Off. Rec. No. 447, OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, Vol. 1 at 88, art. 21.
26. Id. art. 13.
27. An example of this is the duty of the Executive Secretary, who drafts the
budget of the Commission with the Chairman. See OAS, Rules of Procedure of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 12(l)b, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.
(2009-2013), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/rulesiachr.asp.
28. This is the thesis of one of the first commentators on the Inter-American Com-
mission. See Jos6 Cabranes, The Protection of Human Rights by the Organization of
American States, 62 AM. J. INT'L L., 889, 894 (1968).
29. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 41. In particular, art. 41 details sev-
eral functions:
a. to develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America;
b. to make recommendations to the governments of the member states, when it
considers such action advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures in favor
of human rights within the framework of their domestic law and constitutional
provisions as well as appropriate measures to further the observance of those
rights;
c. to prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the performance of
its duties;
d. to request the governments of the member states to supply it with information
on the measures adopted by them in matters of human rights;
e. to respond, through the General Secretariat of the Organization of American
States, to inquiries made by the member states on matters related to human rights
and, within the limits of its possibilities, to provide those states with the advisory
services they request;
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From 1960 to present day, the Commission's functions have evolved
and enlarged. Currently, the Commission undertakes a wide array of tasks:
it issues recommendations in individual cases 30 and it can present cases
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights if the concerned states do
not follow the recommendations. 3 It has also established several rap-
porteurships to pay special attention to topics such as freedom of speech or
rights of children. 32 It adopts reports on particular countries or on particular
subjects within a country.33 The Commission can also order precautionary
measures. 34 These measures are urgent requests, directed to an OAS Mem-
ber State, to take immediate action in serious and urgent cases to prevent a
grave and irreparable harm. 35 The Commission also performs in-loco obser-
vations-on-site visits to member states with various purposes such as in-
terviewing victims, collecting testimonies or generating public pressure on
a particular country "with the consent or at the invitation of the government
f. to take action on petitions and other communications pursuant to its authority
under the provisions of art. 44 through 51 of this Convention; and
g. to submit an annual report to the General Assembly of the Organization of
American States.
30. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 50.
31. Id. arts. 57, 61.
32. Since 1990, the Commission started creating thematic rapporteurships to focus
on particular rights or vulnerable group. This would enhance the Commissions task. See
generally, OAS, Thematic Rapporteurships and Units, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., http://
www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/rapporteurships.asp. Currently, there are nine rap-
porteurships, in charge of one Commissioner each (on economic, social and cultural
rights; on the rights of indigenous people; on the rights of women; on the rights of
migrants; on the rights of the child; on human rights defenders; on the rights of persons
deprived of liberty; on the rights of afro-descendants and against racial discrimination;
on the rights of lesbian, gay, trans, bisexual and intersex persons) and one special rap-
porteurship for freedom of expression, whose head is an external expert distinct from a
Commissioner.
33. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 41.
34. The American Convention does not expressly recognize precautionary mea-
sures. This type of quasi-judicial measure was established for first time in art. 25 of the
rules of the 1980s rules of procedure. OAS, Precautionary Measures, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp; See also OAS,
Reglamento de la Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Rules of Procedure
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights], Apr. 8, 1980, OEA/Ser. L/V/
11.49, doc. 6 rev. 4. According to Faundez Ledesma, since 1996 it is possible to note an
increasing number and importance of the use of this mechanism by the Commission.
FAUNDES LEDESMA, supra note 18, at 371.
35. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
supra note 28, art. 25.
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in question. '36 Lastly, the Commission presents a yearly report on the situa-
tion of human rights in the Americas, the content of which accounts for all
activities performed by the Commission. The report includes a chapter that
identifies the states whose human rights record deserves in depth
attention. 37
36. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 26,
art. 18(g).
37. The Commission has drafted reports since its very beginning. According to the
Commission's recount, since 1977 it has considered that some states deserved particular
concern. In 1997 the Commission established five criteria to include states in this
chapter:
1. The first criterion encompasses those states ruled by governments that have not
come to power through popular elections, by secret, genuine, periodic, and free
suffrage, according to internationally accepted standards and principles. The Com-
mission has repeatedly pointed out that representative democracy and its mecha-
nisms are essential for achieving the rule of law and respect for human rights. As
for those states that do not observe the political rights enshrined in the American
Declaration and the American Convention, the Commission fulfills its duty to in-
form the other OAS members states as to the human rights situation of the
population.
2. The second criterion concerns states where the free exercise of the rights set
forth in the American Convention or American Declaration have been, in effect,
suspended totally or in part, by virtue of the imposition of exceptional measures,
such as state of emergency, state of siege, suspension of guarantees, or exceptional
security measures, and the like.
3. The third criterion to justify the inclusion in this chapter of a particular state is
when there is clear and convincing evidence that a state commits massive and
grave violations of the human rights guaranteed in the American Convention, the
American Declaration, and all other applicable human rights instruments. In so
doing, the Commission highlights the fundamental rights that cannot be sus-
pended; thus it is especially concerned about violations such as extrajudicial ex-
ecutions, torture, and forced disappearances. Thus, when the Commission receives
credible communications denouncing such violations by a particular state which
are attested to or corroborated by the reports or findings of other governmental or
intergovernmental bodies and/or of respected national and international human
rights organizations, the Commission believes that it has a duty to bring such situa-
tions to the attention of the Organization and its member states.
4. The fourth criterion concerns those states that are in a process of transition from
any of the above three situations.
5. The fifth criterion regards temporary or structural situations that may appear in
member states confronted, for various reasons, with situations that seriously affect
the enjoyment of fundamental rights enshrined in the American Convention or the
American Declaration. This criterion includes, for example: grave situations of
violations that prevent the proper application of the rule of law; serious institu-
tional crises; processes of institutional change which have negative consequences
for human rights; or grave omissions in the adoption of the provisions necessary
for the effective exercise of fundamental rights.
[Vol. 22
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2. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established in 1978,
when the American Convention on Human Rights entered into force. 38 The
establishment of the Court represented a benchmark in the history of the
Inter-American System, as it was designed to be able to issue binding deci-
sions that states undertook to fulfill in all cases to which they are parties. 9
Like the Commission, the Court has seven members. They are all
judges, who must be qualified for the highest judicial court of their native
country, selected by the General Assembly of the OAS. 40 They are ap-
pointed for six years with the possibility of one re-election. 4 1
The role of the Court starts after the Commission has issued a report
under Art. 50 of the Convention "setting forth the facts and stating its con-
clusion, ' '42 whether there has been a violation or not. If the state does not
follow the recommendation, the Commission will subsequently present the
case before the Court43 in order to obtain a binding decision. 44 The proce-
dure before the Court is, basically, a judicial procedure in which the state is
the defendant, and the Commission-not the victim-is the main plaintiff,45
as only the Commission can bring the case before the Court. There is a
trend, however, to increase the significance of the role of the victim before
the Court. In such a way, although victims cannot enjoy the Court's juris-
diction, once the case has been sent by the Commission, they can "submit
their brief containing pleadings, motions, and evidence autonomously and
See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.LN/II.98, doc. 6, ch. V., rev. Apr. 13, 1998,
available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/97eng/chap.5.htm.
38. On the history of the Court, see Inter-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts., I/A Court History,
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/historia-de-la-corteidh.
39. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 68.
40. Id. art. 53.
41. Id.
42. Id. art. 50.
43. Under art. 45 of the 2013 Rules of Procedure, the Commission will present the
art. 51 report by default-this is, it will refer the case to the Court unless by a reasoned
decision it decides not to do so. See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, supra note 28.
44. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 61. The Inter-American Court, inter-
preting article 61, stated that a government cannot waive the fulfilment of the regular
procedures set forth in article 61 of the American Convention. See Viviana Gallardo v.
Gov't of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion G. 101/81, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 101,
12-25 (Nov. 13, 1982).
45. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
supra note 28, art. 45.
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shall continue to act autonomously throughout the proceedings. '46 As a sec-
ondary feature the Court also has advisory jurisdiction. 47 In this sense, the
Court is in charge of responding to consultations that member states or or-
gans of the OAS make "regarding the interpretation of [the] Convention or
of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American
states."4
8
B. The Current Crisis of the System
Recent years have been difficult for the Inter-American Human Rights
System. Several state parties to the OAS have constantly criticized the
Commission, and in April 2012, a process for reforming the system, euphe-
mistically named "Process of Strengthening of the Inter-American System
for the Protection of Human Rights," took off.4 9 This process grew out of
instability in the system and, though the crisis has nominally been resolved,
major challenges remain.
Although it is not easy to clarify all the reasons for the full revision of
the system, three precise problems unleashed the difficulties. The first prob-
lem was that countries such as Nicaragua, Ecuador, and especially Vene-
zuela50 denounced what they called an excessive intervention by the
Commission in their internal affairs.5 These states were particularly vocal
about what they saw as over-reaching by the Commission's Special Rap-
porteur for Freedom of Speech. Indeed, the continuous scrutiny over its
internal situation led Venezuela to withdraw from the American Convention
46. Id. art. 25 (1).
47. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 64.
48. Id.
49. For the a brief description and history of the procedure, see generally Process
for Strengthening the IACHR: Methodology, supra note 7; See also, Claudio Grossman,
The Future of the Inter-American System of Human Rights: Introduction, 20 HuM. RTS.
BRIEF 2 (2012-2013).
50. Venezuela's late presidente Hugo Chivez had a long story with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, and specially with its executive secretary
from 1999 until 2012, Santiago Cant6n. According to late President Chivez, the Com-
mission approved the failed coup of 2002. The Commission always denied these allega-
tions, saying that it immediately condemned the strike. On this issue, for the
Commission's story, see OAS, Report on Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 54, 3, 7 (Dec. 30, 2009). For Vene-
zuela's side, see Minister of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Re-
public of Venezuela, supra note 6, at 6, 18.
51. Jackson Diehl, Opinion, Will the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights be gutted?, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-
03-03/opinions/37418252_1 oas-ministers-rafael-correa-jose-miguel-insulza.
[Vol. 22
Back to Politics
on Human Rights.52 The displeasure of these States towards the Rapporteur
for Freedom of Speech is not surprising, since such states have questioned
the post-World War II liberal model of democracy. 53 Freedom of expression
is a core value within the liberal democratic political system. 54 Thus, free-
dom of expression came under fire.
The second problem was the United States' persistent refusal to ratify
the American Convention on Human Rights (although it signed the Ameri-
can Declaration). 55 The lack of U.S. ratification enabled many States, led by
Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua, to argue that the Inter-American Sys-
tem was an instrument of U.S. imperialism. 56 The U.S., they suggested, was
using the system to manipulate Latin-American states while not allowing
itself to be controlled by the same rules. 57 This claim for equality is not new
in international law. Precisely, the idea of a sovereign state allowing exter-
nal control rests upon the basis of every other sovereign doing the same.
58
The claim for universality-one of the basic pillars of the human rights
idea-was thus grossly undermined by the refusal of the most powerful
state in the region to follow the rules like everybody else.59
52. In the Note of Denounciation, supra note 5 1, at 3, Venezuela argued that:
[l]n recent years the practices of the organs governed by the Pact of San Josd, both
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, have distanced themselves from the sacred principles they are
called upon to protect. They have become a political weapon aimed at undermin-
ing the stability of specific governments, especially our country's, by adopting
lines of action that interfere in the internal affairs of our government, violating and
ignoring the basic, essential principles widely recognized in international law.
53. Bruce W. Jentleson, The John Homes Memorial Lecture: Global Governance
in a Copernican World, 18 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 133, 137 (2012).
54. Claudio Grossman, former president of the Commission, has stated "[s]ome
countries view classical notions of human rights law, such as an independent judiciary,
separation of powers, and freedom of expression, as contrary to their political projects."
See Grossman, supra note 50, at 3.
55. The United States signed the American Convention on June 1, 1977 but it
never ratified the Convention. Canada is in a worse position than the U.S.; Canada
never even signed the American Convention.
56. See, Note of Denounciation, supra note 51, at 20-21.
57. Francisco J. Rivera Juaristi, U.S. Exceptionalism and the Strengthening Pro-
cess of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 20 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 19 (2013).
58. Beth A. Simmons suggests a critical factor for States to ratify a human rights
treaty is the practices of other states in the region. Beth A. Simmons, Reflections on
Mobilizing for Human Rights, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 729, 741-742 (2012).
59. Goodman and Jinks suggest that "inclusive membership in human rights IGOs
helps express that universalizing message." RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIAL-
IZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW, 101 (2013).
Relevant to this point, Harold Koh states that the US long-maintained practice of not
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The third problem arose when the Commission compromised Brazil's
support, after the Belo Monte case. Brazil's attacks to the system had a
strong effect, distinct from those of Venezuela and the U.S., because it
came from one of the Commission's allies. Belo Monte is world's third-
biggest hydroelectric project. Located on the Xingu River, its construction
was supposed to affect several indigenous communities. 60 On April 11,
2011, the Commission granted precautionary measures in favor of the mem-
bers of these communities-precautionary measures are urgent measures
adopted by the Commission to protect a human right from a grave and im-
minent violation. 61 These measures requested Brazil to suspend the "the li-
censing process for the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Plant project and [to]
stop any construction work from moving forward until certain minimum
conditions are met."'62 As it is possible to see, the Commission was ordering
Brazil to stop a third party, foreign to the Commission's procedure-the
corporation in charge of building the damn-from continuing its activities.
Brazil had such a strong reaction against these precautionary mea-
sures 63 that the Commission, a mere three months later, reviewed the mea-
sures, withdrew its request to suspend the construction of the project, and
only left the precautionary measures regarding the protection of the "lives,
health, and physical integrity" of the communities in voluntary isolation. It
ratifying human rights treaties undermines US moral leadership and puts it with the
worst companions. See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1479, 1485-86 (2003).
60. The rights and wrongs of Belo Monte, THE ECONOMIST, May 4, 2013, http://
www.economist.com/news/americas/21577073-having-spent-heavily-make-worlds-
third-biggest-hydroelectric-project-greener-brazil.
61. Regarding precautionary measures, see Felipe Gonzalez, Urgent Measures in
the Inter-American System, 7 SUR: INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 51 (2010).
62. Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin, Pard, Brazil, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., PM 382/10, OEA/Ser.LN/II. doc. 69, 32-33 (2011). The conditions
requested by the Commission were for the State to: (i) conduct a good faith and in-
formed consultation process, in accordance to Brazil's international obligations; (ii) and
to secure the life and physical integrity of the members of indigenous people in volun-
tary isolation, which might suffer diseases for the affluence of people and as well as
some water related diseases.
63. The Foreign Affairs Minister issued declarations saying that the Commission's
request was premature and unjustified. Press Release, Minist~rio das Relaq3es Exteri-
ores, Solicitagdo da Comissdo Interamericana de Direitos Humanos (CIDH) da OEA,
(Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-im-
prensa/solicitacao-da-comissao-interamericana-de-direitos-humanos-cidh-da-oea/
?searchterm=belo%20monte. In English see, Brazil rejects request to halt Belo Monte
dam in Amazon, BBC, (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-
12990099.
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urged Brazil to implement the plan Brazil alleged it was already implement-
ing when the first measures were granted-making the capitulation a bit
ironic.64
The Brazilian case showed two legal problems. On the one hand, the
very idea of precautionary measures, which has no legal base either in the
American Convention or in the Commission Statute, was challenged. On
the other hand, the Commission construed the language of its own rules of
procedure too broadly in order to expand the reach of precautionary mea-
sures,65 revealing a pattern that allowed member states to criticize the
64. See, The rights and wrongs of Belo Monte, supra note 61, at T 33. For the
Commission, this was an elegant retreat: it kept some of the measures, but it opened the
door for Brazil to pursue the project.
65. Art. 25 of the Rules of Procedure in place when PM 382/10 were issued
stated:
Precautionary Measures.
I. In serious and urgent situations, the Commission may, on its own initiative or at
the request of a party, request that a State adopt precautionary measures to prevent
irreparable harm to persons or to the subject matter of the proceedings in connec-
tion with a pending petition or case.
2. In serious and urgent situations, the Commission may, on its own initiative or at
the request of a party, request that a State adopt precautionary measures to prevent
irreparable harm to persons under the jurisdiction of the State concerned, indepen-
dently of any pending petition or case.
3. The measures referred to in paragraphs I and 2 above may be of a collective
nature to prevent irreparable harm to persons due to their association with an or-
ganization, a group, or a community with identified or identifiable members.
4. The Commission shall consider the gravity and urgency of the situation, its
context and the imminence of the harm in question when deciding whether to
request that a State adopt precautionary measures. The Commission shall also take
into account:
a.whether the situation of risk has been brought to the attention of the pertinent
authorities or the reasons why it might not have been possible to do so;
b. the individual identification of the potential beneficiaries of the precautionary
measures or the identification of the group to which they belong; and
c. the express consent of the potential beneficiaries whenever the request is filed
before the Commission by a third party unless the absence of consent is duly
justified.
5. Prior to the adoption of precautionary measures, the Commission shall request
relevant information to the State concerned, unless the urgency of the situation
warrants the immediate granting of the measures.
6. The Commission shall evaluate periodically whether it is pertinent to maintain
any precautionary measures granted.
7. At any time, the State may file a duly grounded petition that the Commission
withdraws its request for the adoption of precautionary measures. Prior to the
adoption of a decision on the State's petition, the Commission shall request obser-
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Commission, for not conforming its behavior to its mandate.66
Despite its reasoning's lack of a strong treaty basis, the Inter-American
Court has recognized the power of the Commission to grant precautionary
measures. In the case of the Penitenciaras de Mendoza, the Commission
had granted precautionary measures to protect the lives of numerous in-
mates sentenced in the Mendoza (Argentina) penitentiary. Nevertheless,
some of them died. The Commission considered that the state was not com-
plying with its decision, and so requested the Court to issue provisional
measures in favor of the victims. Provisional measures are an injunctive
relief that the Inter-American Court can adopt in cases "of extreme gravity
and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons." 67
It should be highlighted that provisionary measures are mentioned in the
American Convention. 68
The Court stated that in order to protect human rights states must give
the decisions of both the Commission and the Court enough effet utile. In
such manner, states must implement and comply with their decisions. "Sub-
sequently, the presentation before the Court of Provisionary Measures by
the Commission is no reason for the State not to adopt the actions in order
to attend the request for precautionary measures. ' '69
vations from the beneficiaries or their representatives. The submission of such a
petition shall not suspend the enforcement of the precautionary measures granted.
8. The Commission may request relevant information from the interested parties
on any matter related to the granting, observance, and maintenance of precaution-
ary measures. Material non-compliance by the beneficiaries or their representa-
tives with such a request may be considered a ground for the Commission to
withdraw a request that the State adopt precautionary measures. With regard to
precautionary measures of a collective nature, the Commission may establish other
appropriate mechanisms of periodic follow-up and review.
9. The granting of such measures and their adoption by the State shall not consti-
tute a prejudgment on the violation of the rights protected by the American Con-
vention on Human Rights or other applicable instruments.
See OAS, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Inter-Am. Comm'n Hum. Rts. (2009), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/man-
date/Basics/rulesiachr2009.asp.
66. Note of Denunciation, supra note 51, at 17.
67. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 63 (2).
68. Id.
69. Penitenciarfas de Mendoza rescpecto de la Reptiblica de Argentina, Medidas
Provisionales, Resoluci6n de la corte, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. E) "Vistos," 16 (Nov.
22, 2004), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/penitenciariamendoza se_01.pdf.
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Precautionary measures were, however, usually understood to deal
with the most urgent matters, able to produce an irreparable damage. 70 And
in the Belo Monte case, although it was true that the project required the
displacement of some communities from their traditional lands, the situa-
tion did not seem grave enough to demand protection through precautionary
measures, according to a strict construction of the text of the rules of
procedure. 7'
The conjunction of these three situations resulted in the crisis. To deal
with it, states set up the aforementioned strengthening process. Within the
process, the complaining States articulated six basic claims to reform the
system:72 (i) a new procedure to appoint the Executive Secretary of the
Inter-American Commission; (ii) an increase in transparency and predict-
ability of the system of precautionary measures; (iii) a promotion of the
efficiency and transparency in the management mechanisms of the Com-
mission regarding individual cases; (iv) a priorization of friendly settle-
ments; (v) a revision of the criteria for including states deserving special
attention in the annual report of the Commission; and (vi) a financial
strengthening of the Inter-American Human Rights System.
As a general response, on March 18, 2013, the Commission approved
Resolution 1/13 on the Reform of the Rules of Procedure, Policies and
Practices, which addressed these concerns. 73 On March 23, 2013 the OAS
General Assembly adopted a resolution to conclude the process.7 4 While the
Commission showed political will to make changes, the same lacked on the
70. In 1996 the Commission decided to include for first time in its annual report a
section on precautionary measures "under the provisions of Article 29 of its [1980]
Rules of Procedure, in cases of extreme gravity and urgency in which it is necessary to
avoid irreparable damage to persons." Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Annual Report, OEA/
Ser.LIV/II.95,?doc. 7, ch. 2, 4 rev.?(Mar. 14, 1997). The Commission has, however,
issued precautionary measures in circumstances that would not be considered as grave,
such as cases regarding electoral process or property rights related to freedom of ex-
pression. FAUNDEZ LEDESMA, supra note 18, at 377-380.
71. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
supra note 28.
72. Report of the Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights with a view to Strengthening the Inter-Ameri-
can Human Rights System for consideration by the Permanent Council, OEA/Ser.G GT/
SIDH-13/1I rev. 2, (Dec. 13, 2011). The final document showed the comments and
concerns of a wide array of participants in the process: States, the Commission, and
civil society organization.
73. OAS, Reform of the Rules of Procedure, Policies and Practices, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Res. 1/13, (Mar. 18, 2013).
74. Results of the Process of Reflection on the Workings of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights with a View to Strengthening the Inter-American
2015-2016]
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
states' side. Thus, not many of the flaws were really addressed. The Com-
mission clarified its standards for issuing precautionary measures, 75 and
slightly changed the procedure to nominate the executive secretary.7 6 How-
ever, the U.S. has not ratified the American Convention, the Commission's
budget has not risen77 and, consequently, the Commission keeps trying to
deal with an unmanageable workload risking discredit for not being able to
provide resolutions in a timely fashion.7 8
Therefore, the problem does not seem to be in the Commission's man-
agement failure or in its weak accountability. These are minor issues that
can easily be adjusted. The actual question is whether states have political
will to be supervised by the Commission and the Court or not. The chal-
lenge, then, is how to increase states' political will. In the next section I will
paint a scenario that must be understood in order to successfully play the
human rights game. Rules have changed, and the Commission might need
to adapt to them in order to thrive.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS: DYNAMICS, PLAYERS AND WEAKNESSES
A. Times are Changing: Three Features of Human Rights' Dynamics
Today
The world has changed significantly over the last sixty years. The Cold
War is over, China has emerged as a super-power, and the universality of
human rights has been questioned.7 9 In this chapter, I will argue that, in
Human Rights System, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.P AG/RES. I (XLIV-E/13)
rev. 1 (Jul. 23, 2013).
75. See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
supra note 28, art. 25.
76. See id. art. 11.
77. For a general description of the financial situation of the Commission, see
Maria Claudia Pulido, Budgetary and Financial Challenges Facing the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights of the OAS, DPLF, 16 APORTES DPLF 59 (2012).
78. The IACHR strategic plan for 2011-2015 indicates that the average time for an
individual petition to go through the admissibility and merits phases is of 6 years. We
should add to this the time for the initial evaluation, for which the information is that
there is a significant backlog. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Strategic Plan 2011-2015,
44 (2016). At the end of 2012, there were 7208 petitions pending of initial evaluation.
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.LV/II. 147 Doc. I, ch. III, chart G, 54 (Mar. 5,
2013).
79. Jentleson, supra note 54. Regarding the universality of the human rights idea,
the immediate efforts post-1945 to secure human rights enjoyed wide consensus. Julien
Huxley, then director of the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO), "created a committee to investigate whether there were areas of poten-
tial agreement among the world's varied cultural, religious, and philosophical
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order to improve the efficacy of the Commission, it would be appropriate to
pay attention to new developments-quiet and bloodless revolutions-that
the world has experienced. These developments include: (i) the global gov-
ernance process as a way of providing collective goods; (ii) the entrance of
new actors in the field of international politics; and (iii) the evolution of
international law.
These three transformations have redefined the way in which human
rights protection is to be achieved. A salient feature of international law is
the absence of a world government to enforce it.80 The lack of an enforcing
authority and, at the same time, the impression of some sort of order in the
world-or at least not a total chaos-paved the way to the emergence of the
idea of a global governance. This idea developed as a concept capable of
describing the range of both informal and formal values, norms, and institu-
tions that deliver some order and predictability in the world.8' In this sense,
traditions." MARY ANN GLENDON, THE FORUM AND THE TOWER. How SCHOLARS AND
POLITICIANS HAVE IMAGINED THE WORLD, FROM PLATO TO ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 203
(2011). To build that consensus, however, philosophers from all over the world focused
on the practical aspects of human rights instead of their foundation. In such a way,
Maritain-who had a great influence in the project-wrote:
"How," I asked, "can we imagine an agreement of minds between men who are
gathered together precisely in order to accomplish a common intellectual task, men
who come from the four corners of the globe and who not only belong to different
cultures and civilizations, but are of antagonistic spiritual associations and schools
of thought ..." Because, as I said at the beginning of my speech, the goal of
UNESCO is a practical goal, agreement between minds can be reached spontane-
ously, not on the basis of common speculative ideas, but on common practical
ideas, not on the affirmation of one and the same conception of the world, of man
and of knowledge, but upon the affirmation of a single body of beliefs for gui-
dance in action.
JACQUES MARITAIN, HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS, 9-17 (Allan
Wingate, 1949). Among the respondents were figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Bene-
detto Croce, E. H. Carr, Chung-Shul Lo, and Aldous Huxley. See GLENDON, THE Fo-
RUM AND THE TOWER 203.
80. Thomas G. Weiss, What Happened to the Idea of World Government? 53
INT'L STUD. Q. 253 (2009), suggests that the idea of global governance is too week. In
his piece, Weiss discredits the idea of global governance (a soft and informal way of
organizing international affairs in a civilized way) as not enough for what the world
needs, and supports the idea of a world government (a much stronger idea, that includes
agencies and coercion). Weiss emphasizes that global problems need a kind of answer
that global governance cannot provide.
81. Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg, Global Governance as a Perspective
on World Politics, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 185, 198 (2006), criticizing the over-
breadth that the concept of "global governance" has acquired through literature. There-
fore, according to these authors, there is a need to refine the concept. For that reason,
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the concept of global governance explains the way in which collective
goods, such as human rights or economic stability, are provided at the
global level.
8 2
The notion of governance requires examining international reality
through a multi-actor perspective that permits identification of a diverse
array of players who interact at different levels. 83 International law and
politics used to be a conversation, precisely, between nations. Not anymore.
Individuals, multinational corporations and global non-profit organizations
have earned a place as new actors in the table. In such a way, the idea of
governance mirrors the dilution of power that allows the manifestation of
authorities different from the states which, in classical international law,
were the only legitimate subjects.8 4 Power, in a functional sense, is now
held by the new players. 85 These interactions reflect the fact that, in interna-
tional politics, horizontal coordination associations take the place of the
more traditional vertical and hierarchical relations that belong to the na-
tional level.1
6
they distinguish between the analytical concept of global governance with the term
global governance used as a political program. These authors suggest that the concept
of global governance has lost some of its ability to fully explain what it means, because
it has been widely used that it is at the risk of mean nothing.
82. Weiss, supra note 81, at 257.
83. According to Dingwerth and Pattberg, supra note 82, at 198, global govern-
ance concept is used in opposition to the idea of "inter-national" relations as the only
valid perspective in a global state-based system. In such a way, global governance de-
parts from traditional views of international relations in four important ways: (i) Multi-
actor perspective; (ii) different levels and interaction; (iii) horizontal coordination; and
(iv) new and different authorities. John G. Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public
Domain, 10 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 499, 504 (2004), says that "[glovernance, at whatever
level of social organization it may take place, refers to conducting the public's busi-
ness-to the constellation of authoritative rules, institutions, and practices by means of
which any collectivity manages its affairs."
84. See generally Jentleson, supra note 54.
85. See, for example, Larry Cata Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of
Efficient Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1739 (2006-2007); Kim D. Reimann, A View from the Top: Interna-
tional Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs, 50 INT'L STUD. Q. 45
(2006). For a piece elaborated when this phenomenon started to be perceived, see
WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 375-376
(1964).
86. According to Weiss, supra note 81, at 254-257, global governance is "the
patchwork of formal and informal arrangements among states, international organiza-
tions, and various public-private partnerships." In this system, governance "represents
the range of both informal and formal values, norms, and institutions that provide better
[Vol. 22
Back to Politics
At the same time, the internal-external division has blurred and dia-
logue occurs at many different levels. For example, a decision of the South
African Supreme Court87 (national) considering whether the minimum core
doctrine on social and economic rights, as stated by the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights Committee 88 (international), is used after-
wards by the Colombian Constitutional Court (national) to decide whether
the local government can throw some occupiers out of a private property.89
In the business arena, there is neither in nor out: products are made any-
where and sold everywhere.90 Norms, products, and people penetrate
through boundaries.
The multi-actor perspective helps highlight the fragmentation of gov-
ernance structures-phenomenon legally translated as the fragmentation of
international law. 91 In a few words, this idea refers to the multiple and di-
verse display of institutions, norms, arrangements and decision-making
processes that do not correspond to a universal and fixed order. Regional
regimes coexist with universal institutions; private regulations have similar
practical effects to public regulations and they do so transnationally; non-
profit foundations have higher budgets than some states.92 These mixed ele-
ments generate a new system.
The types of relations between the actors has changed. In this novel
system, the dispersion of forums and institutional arrangements, both at the
universal and regional levels, creates unprecedented competition among in-
order than if we relied purely upon formal regulations and institutions." In such a way,
it is more cooperative than hierarchical.
87. Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom & Others, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC)
(S. Afr).
88. UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 3, art. 2
(Implementation at the National Level), (July 29, 1981).
89. Corte Consituticional [C.C], Sept. 30, 2013, Sentencia T-689/13, Sala Sgptima
de Revisi6n de Tutelas de la Corte Constitucional.
90. "C.E.O.'s rarely talk about 'outsourcing' these days. Their world is now so
integrated that there is no 'out' and no 'in' anymore." Thomas L. Friedman, Made in
the World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012, at SRI 1.
91. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi-
culties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of
the Study Group of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr.
13, 2006).
92. For example, in 2012, The Gates Foundation awarded more grants than the
whole World Health Organization's Budget for 2012-13. See, Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, Annual Report (2012), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/-/me-
dia/GFO/Documents/Annual%20Reports/2012_GatesFoundation_Annual-Report.pdf.
See World Health Organization [WHO], Program Budget for 2012-2013, available at
http://www.who.int/about/resources-planning/programme-budget_2012_ 13/en/.
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stitutions. For instance, OAS competes with the Community of Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean States (CELAC) 93 to be the most legitimate forum of
regional diplomacy; the Group of Twenty, 94 comprised of 19 countries plus
the European Union, threatens the legitimacy of the U.N. Security Coun-
cil. 95 At the human rights level, some countries have expressed willingness
to create a new mechanism apart from the OAS system.96 The same phe-
nomenon that has generated competition between institutional arrangements
has also lead to hierarchy based solutions being replaced by cooperation
and coordination within the governance system. 97 The lack of strong enforc-
ing authorities makes it difficult for some international actors to play the
government part, deciding with imperium. The absence of government is
substituted with persuasion, bargaining and the search for consensus among
the players. In such a way global governance acquires the characteristics of
an ongoing dialogue process.
Within the global governance context, the human rights idea tests the
basis of the governance process. It is interesting to notice, first, that the
human rights concept operates through a distinct rationale: the logic of ab-
solute wrongs and rights, in which bargaining should not be possible. 98 As a
matter of fact, human rights cannot admit trade-offs, 99 the beauty of the
93. Created by the Declaration of the Unity Summit of Latin America and the
Caribbean gathered at the Unity Summit, consisting of the 21st Summit of the Rio
Group and the 2nd Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Develop-
ment (CALC), in the Mayan Riviera, Mexico, on Feb. 23, 2010.
94. The Group of Twenty played a key role in coping with the 2008 financial
crisis. Andrew F. Cooper, The G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee and/or a Con-
tested 'Steering Committee'for the World, 86 INT'L AnF. 741 (2010). Its members are
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States, and European Union. See G20 2016 China, About G20, (Nov.
27, 2015), http://www.g20.org/English/aboutg20/AboutG20/201511 /t20151127
1609.html.
95. G20 members, supra note 95. See also Cooper, supra note 95.
96. Press Release, Foreign Relations Ministry, Ecuador Towards a New Latin
American Architecture of Human Rights (Mar. 20, 2012), http://cancilleria.gob.ec/ecua-
dor-towards-a-new-latin-american-architecture-of-human-rights/?lang=EN.
97. Dingwerth and Pattberg, supra note 82, at 194, citing Holger Murle, Global
Governance: Literaturbericht und Forschungsfra- gen [Global governance: Literature
review and research questions], INEF Report 32, Duisburg: Institut for Entwicklung
und Frieden [INEF], 1998, pp. 10-11.
98. A strong critique of the human rights movement can be found in KENNEDY,
supra note 2.
99. On this particular topic, it is worth reading Sonnenberg and Cavallaro. These
authors explore the possibility of bringing alternative dispute resolution tools to human
rights conflict. As they explain
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human rights idea lies, precisely, in its absoluteness. And as a value-based
concept, the notion of human rights is hard to combine with consequential-
ist utilitarian approaches. 00 Thus, human rights lawyers and activists might
find the idea of negotiation and compromise problematic. Moreover, the
human rights vernacular makes it difficult to find grey zones. There is a
remarkable preference for thinking in terms of compliance-noncompliance
and winning-losing, rather than agreeable transactions or compromises for
mutual benefits.
Human rights conform better to a hierarchical distributional model of
adjudication rather than with a cooperative or transactional model that en-
courages compromise.' 0 ' The previous paragraphs show some sort of mis-
matching pieces here among human rights and the global governance
features. The flexibility of the global governance process clashes with the
rigidity of human rights. We need, however, to add other elements to the
equation. A better understanding of the players can provide interesting
insights.
B. Players: New and Old, Interested and Value-driven
The second idea worth exploring is related to the performers on the
stage of global politics and international law. When the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights was adopted, multinational corporations did not have
the presence or the power that they exhibit today. 10 2 Similarly, neither Am-
[pierhaps the clearest example of the perceived (and often real) tensions between
these two fields has been the "peace versus justice" debate. In its simplest, most
irreconcilable form, the clash between conflict resolution advocates and rights
practitioners posits that situations of conflict can either be managed by accommo-
dating all parties (including rights abusers) or, instead, by advocating justice (that
is, investigation, prosecution, and punishment of rights advocates) regardless of
the consequences.
Sonnenberg and Cavallaro, supra note 10, at 258.
100. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Le-
galization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 147 (2002), stress that
"value activists are reluctant to accept political trade-offs and compromises." See JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART
MILL: ON LIBERTY, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND UTILITARIANISM (Dale E. Miller
notes & commentary, The Modern Library 2002) (discussing utilitarianism).
101. In David Kennedy's view, plausible accomodations among absolute rights
holders are not easy. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 17.
102. John G. Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain, supra note 85, at
503; See JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (2013).
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nesty International10 3 nor the Human Rights Watch existed.'04 Individuals
were slowly emerging as subjects of international law. 05
A useful classification to understand how these players act consists of
dividing them between interest-based actors and value-driven actors. 06 In-
terest-based actors are those whose rational action is driven by a cost-bene-
fit analysis of the gains that a particular behavior will produce. 07 Value-
driven actors, in contrast, base their behavior on moral grounds, on what
they see as proper and improper. In that manner, they can be characterized
as principle players for whom consequentialist logics are not enough to per-
suade them to act for a cause.' 08 At the international plane, states act to a
great extent based on their interest and not on their values.10 9 It would be
103. Amnesty International was founded in 1961. Amnesty International, Where it
all began, http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/history.
104. Human Rights Watch was created in 1978. Human Rights Watch, Our His-
tory, http://www.hrw.org/node/75134.
105. FRIEDMANN, supra note 86, at 375-376 (1964), would say:
The individual, until recently purely an object, not a subject of international law, is
now, in certain respects, acquiring legal status, both actively and passively. In in-
ternational law a far sharper distinction between the corporate and the human indi-
vidual has to be drawn than in municipal law where for many purposes they can be
treated alike. In international law the position of the individual is a problem of the
isolated and helpless human being who may be robbed or imprisoned without due
process, deprived of his nationality or used as a slave labourer. The counterpart has
been, especially since the end of the Second World War, the responsibility of the
individual for murder, ill-treatment or conspicuous participation in organized bru-
tality or even, in certain cases, participation and preparation for aggressive war.
Individual responsibility in international law can, even after the Nuremberg, Tokyo
and Eichman judgments, only extend to a very limited number of individuals, and
the principles of such responsibility are as yet very vague and ill-defined. The
counterpart of the limited responsibility of the individual in international law is
increasing emphasis on individual rights. In this field aspirations far exceed
achievements. There is yet no right to nationality, and the many attempts to estab-
lish codes of human rights have not gone much beyond declarations, except for the
far more specific implementation of human rights and their protection in the Euro-
pean Covenant of Human Rights. But the problem has been posed, and the neces-
sity to protect the individual as such internationally, even against his own state, has
become an accepted postulate of international lawyers, and the recurrent subject of
international debate. What is needed beyond the strengthening of the rights of the
individual in international law is the co-ordination and correlation between the
principles governing the individual's responsibility and his rights.
106. See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 101.
107. Id. at 145.
108. Id.
109. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, and the realist school of international
relations. A quite old but extremely powerful critical analysis of the realist thesis-
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wrong, however, to underestimate the power of value-based choices in this
field: analysis should not be too simplistic, at the risk of overlooking the
complexities of state action. In contrast, human rights NGOs are a usual
example of value-driven actors-in the sense that, in principle, they will not
compromise (e.g. a certain amount of torture is permissible under particular
circumstances). 10
The usual interaction between value-driven and interest-based actors
entails an appeal from the former to the latter to behave in a precise manner
because that is the proper thing to do. The name and shame strategy of the
human rights movement is embedded in this logic." I No other benefits are
offered to a violator for behaving correctly other than not being accused and
shamed as a human rights abuser. In a way, it seems as if the human rights
movement were expecting what Tom Farer has called a "moral epiphany,"
in which the abuser, after seeing himself publicly exposed, will recognize
his wrongs.' 12
The problem, however, of this type of relationship is that it might be
willing to accommodate two different approaches to reality which are un-
questionably arduous to fit together. While the institutionalization of the
human rights idea was the product of a particular moment in history-in
which values were brought to the front-as soon as that momentum was
gone, states returned to their usual interest-based way of being."13 Accord-
ingly, NGO callings and pressure on states to force them to respect human
rights based on value considerations has not been completely successful
naked power is the only true when talking about international law-can be seen in
Myres McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 102 (1952).
110. In their interesting article, Abbott & Snidal, supra note 101, at 146, explain
this idea convincingly: "value actors ... treat bribery and corruption as moral wrongs,
not as consequential goals that can be traded off against other interests."
I 1. Sonnenberg and Cavallaro, supra note 10, at 262.
112. It is worthwhile quoting the whole paragraph:
From its inception, the international human rights movement has operated on the
assumption that the most important means for improving the behavior of delin-
quent regimes is international public opinion. Although human rights activists
often refer merely to the 'shaming effect' of exposure, as if a government shown to
be torturing and murdering its opponents may experience a kind of moral epiphany
or at least be embarrassed into less malignant behavior, their lobbying efforts im-
ply and their private conversations often confirm belief in a more complex chain of
causation. While hoping to trigger pressure from morally sensitive and influential
sectors within the target state, in most instances the real targets of shaming cam-
paigns are citizens of liberal democratic countries.
Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Uni-
corn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 HUM. RTs. Q. 510, 517 (1997).
113. See GLENDON, supra note 80.
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with precisely those states they have been pressing the most. The challenge
here is to find a solution for this inconsistency. The human rights move-
ment, however, has acknowledged the mismatch. To solve it, it has directed
its efforts to convince states of the binding nature of international law.
C. The Weakness of International Law
The absence of enforcement authorities places international human
rights systems-including the Inter-American System-far away from do-
mestic adjudication machineries. States' obedience to international law de-
pends to a great extent on their will to obey, not on a threat of external
enforcement. This is, however, a usual difficulty in international law, and
the reason why the subject of compliance and function of international law
works has attracted so many scholars.1 14
As a general framework to understand how social control functions,
Ian Hurd suggests that there are three types of models that explain compli-
ance with rules: (i) compliance through coercion, (ii) compliance based on
self-interest, and (iii) compliance based on the legitimacy of the rules to be
followed. The first model, coercion, implies a stronger agent that is able to
force a change in the behavior of a weaker agent. 15 The inconvenience of
coercion as a system is that it sows resistance-even if, at the end of the
day, it produces compliance. In that manner, as soon as the force exercised
is not powerful enough, the weaker agent will avoid compliance. When
applied to international human rights law, coercion based theories suggest
that military power and economic sanctions are the principle manner in
which compliance can be achieved. 16
Self-interest is the second theory. It argues that compliance is achieved
through cost-benefit analyses done by the participants, who then commit
not to break the law because they acknowledge the convenience of playing
by the rules (as against obtaining a negative balance of free-riding the sys-
tem). 117 The downside of the self-interest model is that players condition
their acceptance of the rules on the benefits that can be achieved by them;
thus, recalculations take place often. In this system "[a]ctors are constantly
recalculating the expected payoff to remaining in the system and stand
114. See generally, Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106
YALE L. J. 2599 (1997); GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3; GOODMAN & JINKS,
supra note 60.
115. Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT'L. ORC.
379, 383 (1999).
116. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 3, at 134.
117. Hurd, supra note 116, at 386.
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ready to abandon it immediately should some alternative promise greater
utility.," 18
Legitimacy, or authoritative legitimacy, compliance is based on a
sense of moral obligation in which rules are respected because they are
right. In such instances, the actor that obeys a rule because she thinks it is
legitimate will behave by the law as a general principle. Occasional non-
compliance is what will break the usual pattern. 119 Although realists reject
this approach as utopian, 20 when applied to international human rights law,
several reasons indicate that legitimacy is a valid argument for explaining
compliance with international law and human rights law: domestic constitu-
encies might prefer their government to go by the book; or a sense of duty
might move authorities to respect human rights in their international
interactions.
Goodman and Jinks reshape the discussion in an interesting form. Ac-
cording to these authors, there are three justifications to explain compliance
with international law. The first is material inducement, which contains
some of both coercion and self-interest model elements. Material induce-
ment "refers to the process whereby target actors are influenced to change
their behavior by the imposition of material costs or the conferral of mate-
rial benefits."' 12 1 The second is persuasion, which implies compliance be-
cause actors have been convinced of the validity of the rule. 22 There is an
active process in which "[p]ersuaded actors 'internalize' new norms and
rules of appropriate behavior and redefine their interests and identities ac-
cordingly."' 123 Finally, Goodman and Jinks highlight the role of accultura-
tion, which refers to the process in which the actor incorporates the norm
without an active process of internalization. In a way, the acculturated sub-
ject need not be convinced about following the rule because he would never
imagine not complying with it. Particular importance is given to surround-
ing compliance with the norm. General compliance makes it more difficult
for a player to break the norm and get away with it without
consequences. 124
Again, there is a disconnect between what the human rights movement
is expecting from international human rights law and what the latter actu-
ally delivers. 125 The weakness of international law when addressing human
118. Id. at 387.
119. Id. at 388.
120. Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 3.
121. GOODMAN AND JINKS, supra note 60, at 22.
122. Id.; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 101, at 141.
123. GOODMAN AND JINKS, supra note 60, at 22.
124. Id. at 4, 22.
125. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 21-24.
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rights contradicts the human rights movement's attempt to legalize rights.
Activists want more binding treaties and push states to sign and ratify them.
However, states do not seem to take their international human rights com-
mitments seriously-Saudi Arabia signed the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of all Forms of Discrimination against Women in 2000, but women still
cannot drive there. 126 The current status of international law only provides
activists with paint bullets that do not hurt but just stain reputation.
Seeing the bigger picture instead of just focusing on human rights al-
lows the inquirer to understand the human rights dynamics in an unconven-
tional way. It permits a grasp of the tensions that arise in the struggle to
protect human rights, summarized in the following paragraphs:
(i) Human rights defenders work with a rigid concept that gets along
well with hierarchical models of relationship, while the world has
been transformed into a "liquid" space, in which (a) bargaining is the
way in which distributional choices are arranged, and (b) it is difficult
to find non-transactionable goods.
(ii) Human rights are based on a bilateral relationship between states
and individuals. It is difficult to get private actors such as multina-
tional corporations into the picture. 127 Human rights vernacular is a
value-based language in a world full of native interest-based lan-
guage speakers.
(iii) Human rights international adjudication bodies seem to be sitting
in the umpire chair from which they can call and sanction wrongdo-
ings, while few actors seem to be paying attention to them.
(iv) Human rights bodies and activists have no other weaponry to
force wrongdoers to comply with international law than naming and
shaming them.
While these five points sketch out the context in which the human
rights game is played, they also help to figure out the insights behind the
crisis of the Inter-American system. In fact, when applying these conclu-
sions to the Inter-American system situation it seems that, in the first place,
126. See Mohammed Jamjoom, 2 Saudi women detained for driving in ongoing
bid to end ban, CNN (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/01/world/meast/
saudi-arabia-female-drivers-detained/.
127. There is an indirect control through the mediation of domestic law. But it is
the same control that an international human rights body exercises over an individual.
See RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, supra note 103; see also, John H, Knox, The Ruggie Rules:
Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations, in RADU MARES, THE UN GUIDING PRIN-
CIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2012) 51-83; David Bilchitz, A chasm be-
tween 'is' and 'ought'? A critique of the normative foundations of the SRSG's
Framework and Guiding Principles, in HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS 107
(2013).
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the Commission failed to establish a meaningful dialogue with Brazil in the
Belo Monte case. In addition, a key player like the private contractor of the
dam was not even considered. This shows that the Commission signifi-
cantly narrowed its approach to the problem. In the second place, the U.S.
does not care to sign the American Convention because it faces no signifi-
cant costs in failing to do so. And while the Commission can decide
whether the U.S. has fulfilled its obligations under the American Declara-
tion, it has neither enforcing power nor political leverage to make the U.S.
to comply with its decisions. Finally, Venezuela did not find any particular
benefit in engaging in a system that exercises international supervision of
its internal affairs.
In the next section, I will explore a possible solution for these frictions,
focusing on the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. I will sug-
gest that the Commission can improve its efficacy by relying more on its
political functions.
III. POLITICS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
A. Back to Politics
As noted in the previous sections, the Inter-American system has been
dealing with a crisis, the reasons of which are subtler than what a first
glance suggests. In this section, I will focus only on the Commission, apply-
ing a different approach-a political approach-to its problems, in an at-
tempt to solve the tensions described above. To do so, I will first detail the
history of the Commission, demonstrating that my proposal has already
proven its worth. After that, I will draft the possibilities that the political
approach opens to the Commission.
B. The Origins of the Commission, its Political Functions, and the
Example of Argentina, 1979
Among interested persons, activists and scholars, there is a widespread
sense that that the Commission is a quasi-judicial body-or at least that in
the past twenty years, the adjudicative function of the Commission has
gained importance over its political mandate. 128 This sort of collective con-
128. See James L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking Su-
pranational Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 217, 227 (2004) ("[tlhe Commission, created in 1959, is a quasi-judicial body that
promotes human rights through a series of functions that go well beyond the adjudica-
tion of individual cases."); See also Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 559, 560 (2d
ed. 2009) ("[t]he Commission still publishes reports when warranted by serious human
rights conditions in an OAS member state. But such reports have become less central to
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sciousness about the role of the Commission might be the logical conse-
quence of a human rights movement comprised of lawyers, 1 29 who think
about the system in terms of judges, norms, and binding decisions. 130 This
impression is something to bear in mind because, given the scarcity of re-
sources, when the system uses a quasi-judicial approach to solve a conflict,
it will possibly be excluding a political response to the problem.
However, it has not always been like this. In its beginnings the Com-
mission was thought of as a sort of study group or advisory organism.'13 As
time went by, the Commission gained more political leverage, attributing to
itself the power to acknowledge individual complaints, 132 yet without hav-
the Commission's activities as democracy was restored throughout most of Latin
America during the 1980s and 1990s. In their place, the Commission has devoted a
greater portion of its resources to the consideration of petitions alleging violations of the
American Convention."); Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture,
12 HuM. RTS. Q. 439, 442 (1991) (before the adoption of the American Convention,
"[s]ince financial and human resources were limited, the Commission concentrated all
its efforts on the examination of the general situation of human rights in each country.
The examination of individual cases clearly took a secondary place. The Commission
appeared to process them only because it had a duty to do so and not because of a
conviction that its intervention would be helpful. After all, the special procedure for
individual cases did not improve the victims' possibilities for redress, and the Commis-
sion could attempt to solve the cases through an examination of the general human
rights situation in the country. [ ...] Apparently, the Commission viewed itself more as
an international organ with a highly political task to perform than as a technical body
whose main task was to participate in the first phase of a quasi-judicial supervision of
the observance of human rights. The Commission's past made it ill-prepared to effi-
ciently utilize the additional powers the Convention subsequently granted it.").
According to Goldman, supra note 17, at 880 "decisions finding violations of
rights under the American Declaration or the American Convention did not constitute a
significant part of the Commission's work until the 1990s." After 1990 and due to the
increasing numbers of individual petitions that the Commission started receiving, "the
Commission made resolution of cases its top priority during this period".
129. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 27.
130. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 129, at 218.
131. Jose Cabranes, one of the earliest commentators on the Commission, wrote in
1968: "The Statute of the Commission adopted in 1960 by the Council of the O.A.S.,
which defines the Commission's competence, gave little hint of the role which the new
body would fashion for itself within the inter-American system, and indicates that some
Members of the O.A.S. may have supposed that in voting to create the Commission
they had merely voted for the establishment of one more 'study group."' See Cabranes,
supra note 29, at 894. Medina, supra note 129, at 440, suggests that "[t]he Commission
was originally conceived as a study group concerned with abstract investigations in the
field of human rights."
132. Cabranes, supra note 29, at 894. See also Goldman, supra note 17, at 868.
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ing authority to issue binding decisions over these cases. The idea behind
this was that the Commission would document abuses to exert pressure over
violators. 133 The enlargement of the scope of the Commission was subse-
quently endorsed by OAS members through the American Convention on
Human Rights.
There is a key verb in all the legal structure of the Commission-
present since its first decade of existence-which is "to promote."' 34 Since
the very beginning the Commission has been in charge of promoting human
rights in the region. 35 The word "promote" reflects an open mission, not
constrained by formal limits. In a way, from the first moment the Commis-
sion was able to go beyond its mandate because it was in charge of promot-
ing human rights, and this could well mean to do whatever it takes to
improve human rights situations in the region. In such a way, sooner rather
than later the Commission expanded its scope of influence, performing
functions that can be easily classified as political rather than adjudicative.
In addition to its study group purpose it started issuing recommendations to
States136-individually and generally 37-and conducting on-site visits. 38
133. Medina, supra note 129, at 441.
134. FAUNDEZ LEDESMA, supra note 18, at 40 (the Commission has always inter-
preted its competences in a liberal and imaginative manner).
135. Resolution VIII, V Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Rela-
tions, Santiago, 1959, Official Documents, OAS, Series C.11. 5, 4-6 (1959) (creating the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the function of it being the "promotion
of human rights"). Certain Attributions of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Arts. 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the American Convention on Human
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-13/93, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No 13, 23 (July 16,
1993):
From the beginning, the provisions of the inter-American system have charged the
Commission with the 'promotion of human rights' (Resolution VIII, V Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations, Santiago, 1959, Official Docu-
ments, OAS, Series C.11. 5, 4-6) or 'to promote the observance and protection of
human rights' (Art. I I I of the Charter of the OAS as Amended by the Protocol of
Cartagena), as incorporated into Article 41 of the Convention. That is the princi-
pal function of the Commission, which defines and regulates all its other functions,
in particular those granted it by Article 41, and any interpretation must be limited
by those criteria.
136. Cabranes, supra note 29, at 894.
137. At its first session in October 1960, members of the Commission put forth
two different interpretations of paragraph 9. On the one hand, it was maintained that the
correct interpretation is that the Commission is limited to making recommendations to
the governments of member states in general and that it may not do so to member states
in particular. On the other hand the view was strongly supported that the Commission is
empowered to direct its recommendations to one or several states as well as to all of
them together, according to whether the violations are of a general or particular nature.
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In a time in which democracy was uncommon in Latin America, the
Commission played a significant role in protecting rights and helping the
region enter a tough transition. 139 Indeed, the political scene during the 60s,
70s, and 80s in Latin America was unstable. Democratic governments alter-
nated with military regimes. Several states adopted repressive policies that
led to massive human rights violations. 140 In this situation the Commission
gained legitimacy without performing adjudicative functions but through
political involvement, which was achieved in different ways. 141
An interesting example of the Commission's approach to human rights
violations is the case of the on-site visit to Argentina in 1979, and its subse-
quent report. 42 In 1976 Argentina suffered a military coup. The military
government committed systematic human rights violations-one of the sad
innovations was the practice of disappearances-to suppress leftist guerril-
The Commission ruled that the provision empowers it to make general recommenda-
tions to each individual member state, as well as to all of them.
Durward V. Sandifer, Human Rights in the Inter-American System, II How. L.J.
508, 517-18 (1965) (citing, Report on the Work Accomplished during its First Session,
Oct. 3-28, Inter-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts., OEA/Ser. L/V/II. I, Doc. 32, pp. 9-10 (1960)).
138. FAUNDEZ LEDESMA, supra note 19, at 42.
139. Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 795 (2006) states:
[E]ven after the entry into force of the American Convention on Human Rights,
the Commission's in loco investigations occupied much of its time, primarily be-
cause in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s many Latin American countries contin-
ued to be ruled by authoritarian regimes that engaged in widespread violations of
human rights. Most of these states did not, of course, ratify the Convention until
the installation of democratic regimes in their countries. The investigations and
reports of the Commission provided the only means for pressuring these states to
improve their human rights conditions.
140. Henry J. Steiner et al., International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics,
Morals, 1021 (3rd ed. 2007).
141. Santiago A. Cant6n, To Strengthen Human Rights, Change the OAS (Not the
Commission), 20 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 5 (2012-2013). The former executive secretary of
the Commission states:
Few would disagree that the work of the IACHR during the 1970s was critical in
denouncing the massive human rights violations committed by brutal dictatorships
and during the 1980s and 1990s was crucial in supporting the return of democracy.
The Commission's work [... ] includ[ed] country visits, requests for information,
and reports on various human rights situations". I recognize that it is extremely
difficult to define the essence of political, but I would say that "everything-else-to-
the-adjudicative-function [within the Commission mandate might be classified as
political].
142. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, supra note 3.
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las. 143 Finding no protection before domestic judges, many of the perse-
cuted and their families started seeking international protection;' 44 before
the visit to Argentina, the Inter-American Commission had already opened
1,261 cases-an absolute record based on previous years' numbers-in
which individuals cited violations committed by government officials.
14
-
Having received so many complaints, the Commission notified the
Government that it was preparing a report on the Argentinean situation. The
authorities of the regime responded, extending the Commission an invita-
tion to visit the country. 46 The visit was conducted in September 1979,
during which the Commissioners interviewed high level officials, political
parties members, victims, union and religious leaders. They visited deten-
tion centers as well. It is worth noting that the Commission had meetings
with almost every relevant political actor of the country. 147 Subsequent to
the visit, the Commission issued a report that was widely distributed inter-
nationally, and was smuggled inside Argentinean borders. 48 Numerous
commentators and historians believe the visit of the Commission and the
report were instrumental to the fall of the regime.
49
Looking at this case, and facing the current crisis, it is possible to say
that the Commission's job has never been easy. In fact, it has been sub-
143. Cynthia A. Lynch, Constitutional Ambiguity and Abuse in Argentina: The
Military Reign 1976-1983, 6 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS. 353, 360-365 (1988-1989).
144. One of the main supporters of the strategy of internationalizing the resistance
against the military regime was Emilio Mignone, who suffered the disappearance of one
of his daughters. See MARIO DEL CARRIL, LA VIDA DE EMILIO MIGNONE: JUSTICIA,
CATOLICISMO Y DERECHOS HUMANOS (2011).
145. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Strategic Plan 2011-2015, supra note 79, at 44.
146. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. supra note 137, 3.
147. Id. at 44-45.
148. David Weissbrodt & Maria Luisa Bartolomei, The Effectiveness of Interna-
tional Human Rights Pressures: The Case of Argentina, 1976-1983, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1023 (1990-1991) (showing the importance of the report: "The Commission's report,
widely disseminated outside Argentina, was very influential in focusing world public
opinion on the human rights abuses in Argentina. The report thus made it difficult for
outsiders to claim ignorance of the Argentine situation. When the Commission released
the report, newspapers in Argentina published the conclusions and recommendations
together with the government's reply. While the full report was not officially available
in Argentina and no press dared to print it, 500 copies were informally distributed and
2,000 photocopies of a clandestine edition were disseminated to newspapers, journal-
ists, judges, bishops, members of human rights organizations, and other individuals.").
149. Goldman, supra note 17, at 873, states "the Commission's visit to Argentina
in 1979 was its most successful in terms of results." Jorge Taina, The Legacy and Cur-
rent Challenges of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 20 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 43 (2012-2013) (Taina, former executive secretary of the Commission, shares the
same opinion).
2015-2016]
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
jected to pressure every step along the way. However, the Commission has
managed during its history to increase its own political leverage, achieving
impressive results through political actions.15 0
So, a question stands: would the Commission, in the present, benefit
from increasing and strengthening its political side?
C. Is More Politics the Answer to the Crisis?
The Inter-American System, and especially the Commission, is facing
considerable contestation. A low rate of compliance15' joins with sentiments
of rebellion from some States. In addition to this depressing panorama,
there are intrinsic deficiencies of the system, such as financial needs or part-
time commissioners. At the same time, the Commission faces other chal-
lenges, as described above, that range from a resistance to the human rights
idea, to changes in the pattern of governance. When confronting problems,
the enumerated adjudication is always seductive, as its outcome is a tangi-
ble result. It is quick and dirty: it verifies who is wrong, who is right, and
the expectable recomposition. Yet, its drawback is that it usually over-sim-
plifies intricate problems.
I will argue in the following pages that a reinforcement of the political
face of the Commission-though it might have neither a likewise tangible
outcome nor quick-as-adjudication result-can be beneficial in successfully
addressing these complex problems. I recognize that this will mean that the
Commission will be considered as a regular player in the global governance
scenario instead of as a referee that can only provide vertical judgments.
This change will be compensated, however, with the possibility of estab-
lishing meaningful horizontal relationships with other players. Still, I will
suggest that there are some conundrums the resolution of which will not be
easily achieved through adjudication, nor through politics, as they are ge-
netic deficiencies of the system.
1. Making Room for Politics-and Challenge
In an abstract sense, human rights adjudication can be imagined as a
simple triangle, in which victims face states at the same level, before an
150. Other interesting cases are Dominicana in-loco visit in 1965 and the Peru in-
loco visit in 1998. Goldman, supra note 17, at 870, 878.
151. According to the 2012 Annual Report, the state of compliance of the Com-
mission's decided and published decisions during the previous eleven years, full com-
pliance has been achieved in only 21.46%; partial compliance in 59.88%; pending
compliance reaches as to 19.64%. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Annual Report, Chap-
ter 3.D, 81 (June 6, 2013).
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arbiter situated above both of them imposes a sanction-or absolves-with,
usually, no further questions. 5 2
This formula is too much of a stretch to hold in the complexity of the
problems that the Commission is currently facing. Firstly, its structural de-
sign blocks participation of key players such as corporations. Secondly, it
incentives conflict instead of consensus. Thirdly, it enlarges the possibility
of absolute victories and defeats, fueling conflict because one of the players
will get everything while the other will get nothing.
a. A political approach to Belo Monte: the Plebeian
Commission
Let's use the Belo Monte case. Brazil could have reasonably argued
that a cost-benefit analysis showed that the displacement of the communi-
ties would have implied the provision of energy for several millions of peo-
ple, plus the creation of a significant amount of jobs, thus saving another
several million from poverty. Of course, this had the cost of displacing the
communities (assuming that the prior consultation was practiced). If the
Commission can only address this wicked problem 53 through an adjudica-
tive procedure-via a precautionary measure with weak basis in the text of
the treaty-it will not be able to propose a solution that contemplates the
complexities of the case. To add more complexity, under the Commission's
current standards, it would be dubious as to whether the State can displace
indigenous communities without their consent. 154 In such manner, the win-
lose approach to the problem puts the State in a difficult stance because the
incentives to generate a crisis are high. Fiercely threatening the Commis-
sion would be a plausible way to force it to retreat.
152. Sonnenberg & Cavallaro, supra note 10, at 264, state "[any success by the
rights advocates implies a retreat by the forces responsible for rights abuse: thus a clas-
sic zero-sum view of the world."
153. Wicked problems are those social problems that have neither unique nor sim-
ple solutions. They are often re-solved because they often re-appear. They have no true
or false answer but good or bad approaches. See generallv Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin
M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theor of Planning, 4 POL'Y Sci. 155 (1973).
154. Indigenous and Tribal Peoples' Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natu-
ral Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/VII.?Doc. 56/09, 186 (Dec. 30, 2009) ("As with
the right to territorial property in general, indigenous and tribal peoples' right to prop-
erty over the natural resources may not be legally extinguished or altered by State au-
thorities without the peoples' full and informed consultation and consent.").
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The flip-side approach to this case would be political. This means that
the Commission would try to persuade, not to impose. 55 If it cannot per-
suade the State, it would try to reach a compromise between the parties.
That would involve acknowledging-and making a good faith effort to un-
derstand-the reasons of the state, not only of the victims. Moreover, the
political approach would require compromises from both sides, not only the
State. This might be hard to accept from the victims' perspective. However,
the Commission, as a political body, must not betray the larger picture.' 56
This larger picture idea collides with the structural limits of adjudica-
tive procedures, in which only the State and the claiming victims have
standing, whereas the rest of the population's interests or the contractor's
interests remain unattended. The contractor point of view should not be
dismissed. The breach of contract might mean the sacrifice of millions of
state dollars. As a side comment, in this matter the personal contact be-
tween the Commission and high-level officials of the State would be
crucial.157
In a way, getting down from the triangle's pinnacle to the plebeian's
leveled ground would permit the Commission to engage states in meaning-
ful discussions. The Commission could provide reasons that can be substan-
tially challenged by the States-something that should also lead to
improving the Commission's work. 58 The inflexibility of the adversarial
system to deal with politically complex cases might well be leading to
states leaving the system, as in the case of Venezuela, or States endangering
the system's survival, as is happening with Ecuador's move to reform the
Inter-American System.
155. Under the framework devised by GOODMAN AND JINKS, supra note 60, at 24,
persuasion "requires argument and deliberation in an effort to change the minds of
others".
156. It might be argued against that this idea undermines human rights absolute-
ness. I would respond to that with two things. First of all, there is an inflation of human
rights, and it needs to be discussed whether every right proclaimed in treaties, interna-
tional declarations and so on are human rights-at the risk of losing the strength that the
human rights idea poses. Second of all, I would say that property rights are usually
replaced by an award, saving the basic core of the right. Moreover, compensation is
recognized by the American Convention, art. 21.2.
157. Hearings, within the usual practice before the Commission, do not usually
involve high-ranking officials. Goodman and Jinks, in the context of acculturation, sug-
gest that the exercise of good offices by high-level officials such as the European Com-
missioner for minorities encourages desirable behavior. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note
60, at 126-127.
158. Id. at 126-127. They argue that human rights regimes can encourage desira-
ble behavior by "systematically engaging governments in discussion about controversial
practices."
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b. A little more conversation
Hard-adjudication, or its ancestor over-legalization 59 creates an obey-
or-leave system in which states might feel ambushed without many incen-
tives to stay in the game, because they do not have enough motivation to
argue with the Commission if their reasons will not be listened to.
Controlled rebellion might then be positive for the system, to some
extent. Unless the Commission has some sort of divine illumination, fol-
lowing its decisions without challenging them in good faith as if they were
binding-when they are not-would be irrational. Thus, if the Commission
wants to be taken seriously by a state, it needs to open up a good faith
dialogue with them. By implication, the state might decide not to comply
with a decision in good faith when it thinks the Commission is wrong-
because, yes, the Commission can err. In such a way, the state is obliged to
"make every effort to apply with the recommendations of a protection organ
such as the Inter-American Commission,"'' 60 because a recommendation is,
in its ordinary meaning, not an order. 161 The solution differs if we talk about
a decision of the Inter-American Court. The Court can make mistakes as
well, but states that accept its contentious jurisdiction undertake not to chal-
lenge and to comply with the decisions in the cases to which they are
parties. 16
2
c. Commission: be what you are supposed to be
According to Goodman and Jinks, an international human rights or-
ganization can use numerous and diverse methodologies to promote human
rights. Options range from soft to hard, and can include (i)publishing best
practices; (ii) monitoring and reporting; (iii) criticizing bad actors; and (iv)
issuing binding decisions and material sanctions. 163 The same authors con-
tinue in a more practical language:
[I]nternational regimes should carry out a number of activities: allo-
cate available resources to assist states in reporting on their own
159. Laurence R. Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1910 (2002). According to Heifer, "(o)verlegalization can
occur where a treaty develops higher levels of obligation, precision, and delegation than
existed when a state first ratified the treaty."
160. Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser C) No 33, 80
(Sept. 17, 1997).
161. Id. at [79.
162. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 68(!).
163. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 60, at 121-122.
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human rights practices (e.g., under Article 40 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), facilitate transnational ex-
perts in human rights consultancy (e.g., the technical and advisory
services of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights)
and create local "receptor sites" for transmitting global norms (e.g.,
by establishing and strengthening national human rights commissions
and ombudsman). 164
The Commission, due to its open mandate-remember that promote is
the key word-is in an outstanding position to do almost all of these activi-
ties (it would not be allowed to establish institutions at the domestic levels).
A critic of this position would suggest that it is actually the possibility
of issuing binding decisions that characterizes a strong international human
rights protection system. However, there are studies that suggest that over-
legalization might bring with it counter reactions, 65 while a soft-law ap-
proach might have better outcomes "establishing durable norms.' 66 In any
case, I would include soft-law within the possibilities of a political
approach.
Seen through the governance process, the political power of the Com-
mission might be a powerful tool for advancing human rights in the region:
it should not be overlooked that the Commission can accomplish a wide
range of actions to achieve human rights protection. Using the model de-
signed by political scientists, Abbott and Snydal, the Commission has the
competence to frame issues, set standards, build capacity, and create institu-
tional places for discussing regulatory processes in order to monitor pro-
gress. 167 These possibilities not only enlarge the Commission's impact, but
also enable local and international activists to engage in the political pro-
cess defining the terms of the discussion. Is this enough? I do not want to
overstate my argument. Human rights adjudication is certainly needed, and
it has been effective. However, the Commission would benefit from en-
hancing not only its adjudicative function but also its political role.
Counterfactual analysis is inherently speculative, but I believe it would not
164. Id. at 129.
165. Helfer, supra note 160.
166. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 60, at 123.
167. These authors describe the regulatory process as comprising five stages:
"placing an issue on the regulatory agenda (Agenda-setting); negotiating, drafting, and
promulgating regulatory standards (Negotiation); implementing standards within the
operations of firms or other targets of regulation (Implementation); monitoring compli-
ance (Monitoring); and promoting compliance and responding to noncompliance (En-
forcement)". Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory
Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGU-
LATION 46, 63 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
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be unreasonable to think that a political approach in the Belo Monte case
would have had different-and better-results.
2. Challenge Permits Engagement, and Engagement Improves
States' Political Will as Members of the System
The lack of compliance with international human rights obligations in
the Americas might be correlated with state parties' lack of political will to
comply with the treaty. 6 In part, the current situation is the result of two
related factors: what states say, and what states do. States say they want an
independent and strong international human rights system. 169 But they do
not make any move in that direction. 70 What is preferable, then: (i) to not
sign a treaty; (ii) to sign a treaty but not comply with it without any justifi-
cation; or (iii) to take seriously the treaty and international commitments
that come with it, meaning, for example, that states may reject a Commis-
sion decision with proper justification?
I would suggest that, in order to improve the overall effectiveness of
the system there is a need to move states from passive signatories (or ra-
tifiers) to active and involved players. States need to challenge the Commis-
sion, to improve its reasoning, as a regular behavior of international
politics.'7 1 Engaging regularly with the system implies both winning and
losing. The times when states win should create enough incentives for them
168. Lea Shaver, The Inter-American Human Rights System: An Effective Institu-
tion for Regional Rights Protection?, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 639, 688
(2010).
169. Venezuela, for example, in its note to denounce the Commission says that
"our country's steadfast resolve to contribute to the construction of our System of
Human Rights of the Americas that, in a genuinely independent and impartial manner,
will help guarantee human rights in the region." See Minister of Popular Power for
Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, supra note 6, at 12.
170. The budget remains almost equal for the Commission, see Pulido, supra note
78. For a similar pattern in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
system, see Yuval Shany, The Effectiveness of the Human Rights Committee and the
Treat Body Reform, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Research Paper No. 02-13, 14
(2013).
171. I would say that in the case of the European Court of Human Rights, there
are occasions in which a State questions a decision issued by the Court, without forcing
the system to its limits. See, e.g., Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01,
2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 189, 220 (2005); Greens and M.T. v. United Kingdom, App.
Nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep 21 (2011); Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3),
App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (2012).
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to not threaten to leave the system when they lose. 172 This approach requires
the Commission to allow challenge, to get off the umpire's chair.
3. Working for the Long Run
There is an additional benefit of engagement. Engaging entails work-
ing with political opponents, not only with governments. Working with op-
ponents gives long-term stability to the system, because it means the system
has worked in favor of those who are not in power. When those who were
not in power accede to it, they have to pay a high political cost to turn
against the Commission, because they have been favored by it.
Argentina's case illustrates this point; the role of the Commission dur-
ing the military dictatorship might have discouraged Argentina from fol-
lowing Ecuador and Venezuela's path in their straightforward attack on the
Inter-American system. 173 In fact, those who were persecuted by military
dictators during the 70s, and experienced the benefits of the Commission's
influences, acceded later on to the government, but they did not move Ar-
gentina to join-at least openly-those attacking the Commission. For
them, the contradiction that shooting the IACHR would have meant was a
deep obstacle. Of course, there are problems that, at least now, seem impos-
sible to solve. The U.S. absence is a persistent obstacle for the system to
develop. However, this is not to be solved by the system, but by time, do-
mestic activism and high international politics. 74
172. That would be a plausible consequence of multilateralism as applied to
human rights regimes. See Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,
supra note 13. The idea of multilateralism implies that States think that in the long run
this system will beneficiate them, even though they might not obtain a particular advan-
tage in every single interaction.
173. For some observers, Argentina's position regarding the strengthening process
was an enigma. See Katya Salazar, The Reform Process of the IACHR: Is There a Light
at the End of the Tunnel? DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOUNDATION BLOG, https://dplf
blog.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/article-on-reform-process-final.pdf.
174. This situation is hardly ideal for various reasons:
From a human rights standpoint, it creates a disadvantage for the inhabitants of
non-ratifying countries by effectively denying them access to the Court in claims
against their respective states. From a political standpoint, it also has negative
consequences, particularly for non-signers. By remaining outside of the Conven-
tion structure the United States and Canada have increasingly found their clout and
credibility challenged in the Organization's political bodies when they have
pressed various Latin American states to live up to their human rights obligations
under the American Convention.
Goldman, supra note 17, at 887.
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4. A (Sad) Successful Case of the Political Approach: the 43
Mexican Students Killed in Ayotzinapa
The massacre of 43 students in Ayotzinapa, Mexico, is a telling exam-
ple of how the Commission can use its political attributions to achieve posi-
tive outcomes without forcing the limits of the system.
The story of this tragedy starts in September 26, 2014, when around
100 young students from the State of Guerrero took three buses to enter the
city of Tixtla, to protest educational reforms. As they were supposedly go-
ing to break in to the meeting hosted by the major's wife-who was a
politician as well-the major ordered the police to stop them. According to
the testimonies, the city police surrounded the buses, detained many of the
students, and afterwards, the students were handed to a criminal gang re-
lated with drug trafficking. 43 students were seen no more, and government
officials have stated that they were probably burned alive. 75
Due to this event, Mexico entered into a deep political turmoil, with
riots and protests occurring all over the country. Beyond the Mexican fron-
tier, artists, human rights activists and religious leaders in every part of the
world expressed their sorrow for what had happened.
In the midst of chaos, two Mexican based human rights organizations
requested the Inter-American Commission adopt precautionary measures in
favor of the students. The Commission quickly adopted the measures, urg-
ing Mexico to take the necessary steps to find the students, in order to pro-
tect their right to life and physical integrity. 76
Mexico's attitude towards the Commission did not resemble Vene-
zuela's or Ecuador's in any way. Instead of confrontation, it opened a venue
for meaningful dialogue with the Commission, which was a credible actor
for the parents of the victims.
In a creative move, the Commission took center stage when it signed a
cooperation agreement with Mexico to assist the government in investigat-
ing the case. Through this agreement, the Commission committed its aid to
solving the case while Mexico accepted this cooperation without consider-
ing it an intrusion of its sovereignty.177
175. Regarding the facts, see Ayotzinapa: A Timeline of the Mass Disappearance
That Has Shaken Mexico Ayotzinapa: A Timeline of the Mass Disappearance That Has
Shaken Mexico, VICE (Dec. 9, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/ayotzinapa-a-time-
line-of-the-mass-disappearance-that-has-shaken-mexico.
176. Estudiantes de la escuela rural "Radl Isidro Burgos", respecto del Estado de
M6xico [Students of the Rural School "Ratil Isidro Burgos", M6xico], Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., PM 409/14 (2014).
177. The agreement was signed by the State of Mexico, the beneficiaries of the
precautionary measures and the IACHR. Acuerdo para la incorporaci6n de asistencia
2015-20161
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
The agreement established that the Commission would form a group of
experts who would have several functions, from elaborating plans to find
the missing students, to analyzing the criminal responsibilities of those in-
volved. In addition, the group of experts would advise on the proper inter-
national standards for treating the victims. 78
Although there are no definitive results up to the moments of writing
these lines, the agreement is a positive proof of alternative approaches to
working out complex human rights cases. By combining the hard judicial
method-precautionary measures-with the more soft diplomatic tactic-
the cooperation agreement-the Commission emerged as a credible actor
for both the state and the victims, forcing Mexico to play the game by the
rules without leaving if it does not like the result, and offering the victims a
strong incentive to use the Inter-American system as an effective mecha-
nism to address their grievances.
It should be noticed that the language the Commission used focused
not on punishing Mexico for its responsibility, but on how to cooperate to
solve a structural problem Mexico faced.
Mexico's cooperative attitude also has its rewards. By bringing the
Commission to the table as a partner instead of as a referee, it lowered the
possibility of being held responsible for not doing enough to find the
whereabouts of the victims, or repairing the consequences of these grave
violations.
In sum, the political approach offers advantages for every player. Vic-
tims have an international protection system that works; states have an ally,
a helping hand, not only a sanctioning referee; finally, the Commission puts
itself at the center and acquires a leading role that makes it relevant.
D. The Limits of Politics: When Compromise is Not Permissible
The idea of political compromise has its limits, however. An interna-
tional organization such as the Commission is constrained not only by its
t6cnica internacional desde la perspectiva de los derechos humanos en la investigaci6n
de la desaparici6n forzada de 43 estudiantes de la normal rural Radil Isidro Burgos de
Ayotzinapa, Guerrera, dentro de las medidas cautelares MC/409/14 y en el marco de las
facultades de monitoreo que ]a cidh ejerce sobre ]a situaci6n de los derechos humanos
en la regi6n [Agreement for the incorporation of international technical assistance from
a human rights perspective in the investigation of the forced dissapearecen of the 43
students of the rural normal school Radl Isidro Burgos of Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, within
the precautionary measures MC/409/14 according to the monitoring mandate that
IACHR exercises over the situation of human rights in the regi6n], OAS, Nov. 12,
2014.
178. Id.
[Vol. 22
Back to Politics
state parties, but also by its own mandate and by the civil society that oper-
ates the system. That is why for the Commission, engagement with states
cannot be accomplished at the price of sacrificing its mandate, which is the
source of its legitimacy. For instance, in the case of Venezuela-where one
of the principle problems was recurrent violations of the right of freedom of
expression' 79-the Commission could not have done anything other than
stand firmly on the side of free speech, for reasons explained below.
Are there any differences between the Brazilian and the Venezuelan
situations? Why is it possible to compromise in the former and not in the
latter? I would say that there are three critical distinctions to be made be-
tween these two cases. First, there was a strong base in the treaties for the
right to freedom of speech (Venezuela), whereas there was not equal basis
for the right to prior consent in the Belo Monte precautionary measures
(although the Commission tried to disguise this right under the cover of the
right to life, health and physical integrity). Second, the type of right in-
volved in the Belo Monte case was possible to balance with other interests.
There might be a compelling interest of the state that outweighs the oppos-
ing right.' 80 On the contrary, the importance of freedom of speech for the
health of a democratic society makes cost-benefit analysis extremely
risky-particularly when the government is the actor conducting the cost-
benefit analysis.' 8' Third, Venezuela's political context was different from
Brazil's. Venezuela had been accused of holding unfair elections. 8 2 The
government severely restricted freedom of speech8 3 and compromised the
judiciary's impartiality, 84 whereas Brazil showed a stronger institutional
179. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 14.
180. Indigenous and Tribal Peoples' Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natu-
ral Resources, supra note 155, at 225, 230.
181. The importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society has been
long recognized by both the Commission and the Court. See generally, Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of
Expresion, OEA/Ser.L/V/I CIDH/RELE/INF. 2/09 (Dec. 30, 2009). It is worth noting,
first of all, that prior censorship is forbidden for almost every case according to art. 13
of the American Convention on Human Rights. That shows that, at least, that type of
restriction results anti-conventional. Second of all, the case-law of the Inter-American
System shows there are some type of speeches that are specially protected-and that
means that it would be rare that a state can demonstrate such a compelling interest to
outweigh it: (i) political speech and speech involving public interest matters; (ii) speech
regarding public officials in the exercise of their duties and candidates for public office;
(iii) speech that express essential elements of personal identity or dignity. See id. at I I-
13.
182. Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, supra note 52, 38.
183. Id. at 347.
184. Id. at 184.
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system, with free press, robust civil society and firm political opposition.
This is something to take into account: a state's internal politics play a
significant role in international human rights law practice, and the Commis-
sion should acknowledge this point. 85
The Commission's withdrawal in Venezuelan cases would have im-
plied a graver long-term loss of legitimacy for the system than the participa-
tion of a non-compliant Venezuela 186 (although the latter would have
undermined the system as well). 87 In this unsolvable dilemma, the Com-
mission needs to adhere tightly to the strict letter of its sources, in order not
to jeopardize its authority.188
E. Why Do Some Measures Generate Compliance, Whereas Other
Generate Crisis? A Model to Predict the Effects of the Commission
Decisions
After reviewing the different aspects of the cases that produced the
crisis, several questions arise. Why did Venezuela and Ecuador agree to
friendly settlements in some cases before the Commission, 189 while threat-
ening the survival of the system with freedom of speech cases? Why did
185. According to Simmons, supra note 59, compliance with human rights im-
proves in democracies. This finding suggests that domestic politics need to be consid-
ered by international organizations. "The Commission has repeatedly pointed out that
representative democracy and its mechanisms are essential for achieving the rule of law
and respect for human rights." Inter-Am. Comm'n Hum. Rts., Annual Report 2012,
supra note 152, at 306.
186. I am not contradicting myself on this. Venezuela could argue with the Com-
mission, but had to comply with the Court.
187. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 60, at 107.
188. A third possible benefit would be that politics permits differentiation that
adjudication does not. Brian Greenhill suggests that states belonging to the same inter-
governmental organizations tend to share similar practices. Brian Greenhill, The Com-
pany You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion ofiHuman Rights Norms,
54 INT'L STUD. Q. 127 (2010). This finding would suggest that a plausible approach to
improve human rights in the long term would be to advance a particular subject against
one State-or, better if, engaging the State in the process; later on, the refusing neigh-
bor State would end up following the compliant State. This sort of differentiation-
requiring more to one State than to other-is more easily achievable through a political
approach rather than an adjudicative approach. Of course, it will hardly get quick re-
sults, but it might work well in the long run.
189. Jesds Manuel Naranjo Cdrdenas y otros (Jubilados de la Empresa Venezolana
de Aviaci6n-Viasa Venezuela) v. Venezuala, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No 63/
13, Case 12.473, Friendly Settlement (July 16, 2013). Ecuador has also agreed friendly
settlements: Karina Montenegro y otras v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 61/13, Case 12.631, Friendly Settlement (July 16, 2013).
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Brazil menace the Inter-American System and withdraw a candidate for the
Inter-American Commission after Belo Monte, 90 while it did not defend
itself on other cases and even accepted international responsibility?' 9' Why
did Argentina flirt with Venezuela's position, 192 if it has been a stable sup-
porter of the system during the last 30 years? Why did Chile, on the other
hand, amend its Constitution following adjudications from the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights?
93
Answering these questions is anything but simple. There are numerous
factors incidental to a plausible answer. In this article, however, I have
mentioned five of them: (i) political approaches versus adjudicative ap-
proaches; (ii) decisions regarding rights textually contained in the text of
the treaty versus decisions regarding rights not literally recognized in the
treaty; (iii) procedures with a strong base in the text of the treaty versus
procedures-the bases of which are not in the treaty but in a weak norm-
such as the rules of procedure; (iv) the internal political situation of a given
country; and (v) the alignment between the government's objectives and the
Commission's objectives.
Although there might be other variables that could be identified as
important to consider, these five elements carry crucial weight when ana-
lyzing whether a decision of the Commission will generate compliance or
not. In fact, the combination of these four factors provides a model for
predicting the consequences of the Commission's decisions.
Although it would require further empirical research, I suspect this
model would support the statement that states' relations with the Inter-
American system are ambiguous. Governments base their actions on the
grounds of international human rights obligations if compliance aligns with
their internal agenda. For example, if a government pursues a liberal agenda
on prison systems and it encounters internal opposition, it will avoid paying
190. Victoria Amato, Taking Stock of the Reflection on the Workings of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, 16 APORTES DPLF 4 (2012).
191. In the case of Maria Da Penha, regarding gender violence, the State did not
defend itself before the Commission. See Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Report No. 54/01, Case 12.051, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.I I Doc. 20 rev. at 704 (2000).
192. Salazar, supra note 174.
193. Case of The Last Temptation of Christ, Judgment of February 5, 2001, Inter-
Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 73 (2001). In this case, the Inter-American Court ruled that
the Chilean constitutional provision that allowed a system of prior censorship for cine-
matographic spectacles was against the American Convention, art. 13. On August 25,
2001, Chile amended its constitution to eliminate prior censorship, replacing it with a
system for rating motion pictures. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Annual Report of the
Secial Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2001, OEA/Ser./L/V/II. 114, doc. 5, 49,
rev. (Apr. 16, 2001).
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a political cost for its decisions, arguing that it cannot do so otherwise be-
cause it has acquired an international obligation. 194 If, however, interna-
tional human rights obligations collide with the domestic agenda of a
government, the state might reject international duties as foreign imposi-
tions. An example of this can be seen in Ecuador's battle against free
speech. If corroborated, this model can improve the Inter-American Com-
mission's exercise of its own political equilibrium. Paying attention to these
elements would allow the Commission to keep playing its game while bear-
ing in mind that the way in which it addresses a human rights situation
might produce different consequences.
This model would permit foreseeing the consequences of the adopted
decisions. Subsequently, it would give the Commission a tool to recognize
moments, places, and legal instruments for expansion as well as for main-
taining the status quo. This model would suggest that while general com-
ments might be useful for creative interpretation of the treaty, adjudication
under Articles 50 or 51-or precautionary measures-will require a text
based approach. It would also permit the Commission to maximize the ben-
efits of a decision. Decisions taken against states with strong democratic
systems-that are not likely to create crisis-might afterwards support the
Commission in taking decisions against non- or less-democratic States.
Also, it would support the Commission in taking the necessary risks to se-
cure the protection of those rights which are the basic pillars of the demo-
cratic system: freedom of speech, political rights, and judicial
independence. In these cases, the Commission should be more willing to
take risks of generating crisis than when protecting other rights.
194. This, for example, happened in Argentina, when the Congress decided
through Law 25.779 to declare absolutely void the Due Obedience Law-Ley de
Obediencia Debida, Law 23.521, passed on June 9, 1987-through which low rank
military officials could not be criminally prosecuted alleging obedience to orders issued
by higher rank officials and the Full Stop Law-Ley de Punto Final, Law 23.492,
passed on Dec. 29, 1986-a statute of limitations for crimes committed during the mili-
tary regime. When enacting Law 25.779, many congressmen cited the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights case law, particularly Barrios Altos Case, Judgment of May 14,
2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 75 (2001). See Diario de Sesiones de la Cdmara
de Diputados de la Nacidn -12 Reuniun- 4' Sesi6n Ordinaria (Especial) - agosto 12
de 2003). The Argentinean Supreme Court validated this action in the case Simon, also
relying in Barrios Altos. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National
Supreme Court of Justice], 14/06/2005, "Simon, Julio H6ctor y otros s/Privaci6n ilegf-
tima de la libertad," Fallos (2005-5-1767) (Arg.).
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CONCLUSION
The history of the Inter-American System shows several triumphs in
the cause of human rights, many of which were accomplished through adju-
dication. This Article acknowledges these victories. However, today the
system is struggling to maintain its power and relevance, and fresh thinking
is required. I have suggested that while adjudication is an advantageous tool
for an international human rights body, in the case of the Commission it
ought to be complemented with a reinforcement of its political role. The
main threat for the Commission today is descent into irrelevance because of
its overreliance on adjudication, which might reduce the Commission into a
noisy voice that is heard but not listened to. In a few words, states need to
start taking the Commission more seriously.
Three premises support my ideas on how that goal may be achieved.
First, I pointed out that the way in which authority and leadership are exer-
cised at the global-and regional-level have significantly changed. Coor-
dination and horizontal relations have gained ground against unilateral
choices and hierarchical impositions-that is the process of global govern-
ance. Second, I have argued that there are new players in the international
system, and it would be wise for the Commission to acknowledge both old
and new players' internal rationales. Third, I have described that non-coer-
cive ways of producing compliance with international law are indeed
relevant.
Next, I described the history of the Commission, showing that in its
origins political functions had a significant weight within its overall respon-
sibilities. Moreover, I have shown that some exceptional successes were
accomplished using political approaches rather than adjudication. I then ex-
plained how the Commission can enhance the political side of its mandate,
as a way to avoid recurring crises, and to improve states political will and
trust in the system. Finally, with the elements I laid out throughout the
Article, I sketched up a model that could help the Commission foresee the
consequences of its decisions.
What I am proposing might not be new, but it has been rather forgot-
ten. The current debate appears to me like a bird that complains because it
cannot bark as a dog, while not recognizing that it can fly. It is essential for
the Commission to create for itself enough political leverage to back up its
decisions and actions. But to move from paper rights to real life rights 95 the
Commission will need to go back to politics.
195. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 129, at 274 (stating: "it may be more effi-
cient for the system to recognize the right to medicine or treatment in a particular matter
as an element of the right to life or the right to physical integrity than to force the
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system to recognize, through the individual petitions process, economic, social, and
cultural rights not deemed ripe for international litigation by states. In short, petitioners
should be more interested in advancing guarantees for victims than in advancing rights
on paper.").
